Xi gets the love bug
Facing a seriously declining birth rate, the Chinese Communist Party has released guidelines to encourage fertility and reduce the nation’s abortions. The ‘Guidelines on further improving and implementing positive reproductive support measures’ request local government authorities to take active measures to increase the birth rate. Issued by 17 organisations, including the powerful Propaganda Department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party, the guidelines urge action across a range of areas, including childcare, housing and education. Some 20 projects in seven program areas are highlighted. There has been no mention of the announcement in the western media. This is unsurprising, given the little in-depth coverage of internal China affairs despite the country being at the epicentre of global geopolitics.
The 11.5 per cent decline in births since 2020 has alarmed authorities. The Chinese birth rate now stands officially at 1.16, barely half of the average of 2.1 births per woman required to replace the population. Even this figure is questionable. Despite findings by the National Statistics Bureau of a Total Fertility Rate [TFR] of 1.22 and 1.18 in 2000 and 2010 respectively, the National Family Planning Commission ‘adjusted’ the rates to 1.6 - 1.8 without explanation. The impact of the Covid pandemic on infertility rates is a significant factor in the recent announcement, with the real fertility rate for the country likely to be below one child per woman. A sharp fall in marriages last year will exacerbate the trends, although more dragon year babies are expected in 2024.
China’s population crisis has been long coming. It has its origins in Deng Xiaoping’s ‘one child policy’ which was devised not by demographers, but by a rocket scientist, Song Jian, who convinced the CCP leadership that the country’s population would soar to four billion people. The prediction was completely misguided, as the TFR in 1980 was only 2.32 and the nation had a high infant mortality rate. The ruthless application of the policy had driven the fertility rate to dangerously low levels well before Covid. The CCP’s zero virus response, which still involves the lockdown of millions of people, has worsened the situation.
The ‘one child policy’ has been slavishly implemented by the National Family Planning Commission. When a population scholar, Yi Fuxian, published his research and conclusions that China’s population rate was built on false and exaggerated data in the book, Big Country with an Empty Nest, it was banned on the mainland and his Weibo accounts deleted repeatedly. According to Yi’s research, the population could fall to around 400 million people by the end of the century, about the same as it was when the Qing Dynasty was overthrown in 1911.
Some senior Chinese leaders have been aware of the consequences of population decline for many years. As Minister for Ageing, I had the opportunity two decades ago to dine with a member of the Politburo. Noting that population growth or decrease is primarily a product of two factors, fertility and mortality, I asked: ‘Aren’t you concerned about the economic consequences of having fewer young people entering into their productive years and a larger ageing unskilled population.’ ‘We are aware of the problem, and we have eased some aspects of the policy,’ was the response.
Many nations, China included, were seduced by the phenomenon known as the ‘demographic dividend.’ This occurs when birth rates first fall, allowing more people, especially women, to enter the paid workforce. Individuals are able to spend and invest more, including in the education of fewer children. The phenomena occurred in Japan and other Asian countries from the 1960s, and in China more recently. But the dividend must be repaid. As the population ages, there are fewer workers and the numbers of dependent aged grows, resulting in a drain on resources. Japan is already experiencing the impact, and China will in the coming two decades, as it enters longer-term depopulation. As a consequence, the country has a huge low-skilled, ageing cohort which depresses savings and investment and slows economic growth. The China Academy of Social Sciences now speaks of an ‘unstoppable decline’ resulting in ‘very unfavourable social and economic consequences,’ as Xi Jinping fights to reverse the situation.
As Singapore’s experience indicates, this is almost impossible. From the late 1950s, the island state adopted a strong anti-natalist program of legalised abortion, voluntary sterilisation and disincentives to have more than two children. The total fertility rate fell from 6.56 in 1957 to just 1.42 in 1986. By the early eighties, the national government became alarmed about the trend. With falling fertility, especially among better-educated women, the government expressed concern about the ‘quality’ of the population. It subsequently introduced measures to encourage more births, including privileged access to high-quality education, income tax relief, childcare leave and subsidies, part-time work rights in the public service, and housing entitlements. While the total fertility rate had increased to 1.6 by 1997, it remained below replacement levels. A subsequent decline was a concern to the government.
In 2001, the New York Times featured the headline: ‘Singapore, Hoping for a Baby boom, Makes Sex a Civic Duty.’ A government office, the Working Committee on Marriage and Procreation, developed monetary and workplace incentives. The idea was to persuade Singaporeans that having children is a better deal than going without. In what it called the Baby Bonus Scheme, the government offered cash to couples that had second and third children. It extended maternity leave and added a brief paternity leave for government workers. It experimented with flexible working hours to make child rearing easier. It is offering special deals on apartment rentals for young couples. It has also increased infant and child-care places, expanded healthcare for couples with children and funded assisted reproductive technology.
‘Let’s get on the love wagon’ urged a headline in the Straits Times. For a nation where dropping litter is regarded as highly disorderly, it came as a surprise to read directions to ‘some of the darkest, most secluded and most romantic spots for Romeos and Juliets.’ Subsequently, the government announced it would fund $50 million over five years to educate the public on family life, including marriage and parenting classes. It also established a service, ‘Marriage Central’, to dispense advice about married life. More recently, the government set up an online dating service to boost marriage rates among graduates. Despite all these measures, the TFR is just 1.12, although some officials believe it to be even lower. Once entrenched, cultural attitudes are difficult to change.
This column was originally published in the Spectator Australia.
